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Abstract 
A long standing area of debate in Western countries is that of the appropriate philoso-
phy for facilitating large scale immigration; should immigrants preserve their traditions 
and culture while living in the host country (integration/multiculturalism) or should they 
assimilate themselves into the ways and manners of their hosts? The ways that nations 
go about resolving this issue goes to the heart of internal policy formulation on immi-
gration but is also influential to the image that the country projects overseas. Countries 
are often labeled according to the official views of their Governments. For example, 
France might be classed as essentially assimilationist and Britain as multi-cultural, 
whereas the Netherlands and Germany might be seen as somewhere between the two, 
but how did these policy differences come about and do they accurately reflect the views 
of the majority of residents of the various countries? This paper addresses part of this 
issue by seeking to identify and analyse the characteristics of those people in Western 
countries who think that immigrants should assimilate culturally and how they differ 
from those who think that immigrants should preserve a separate cultural existence? By 
doing so, it seeks to explain why these inter-country differences in views exist and 
whether they are caused primarily by attribute effects (the composition of the popula-
tion) or by coefficient effects (the strength of the views they hold). This study exploits a 
unique set of data provided by The Human Beliefs and Values Survey to identify and to 
estimate the strength of those factors which lead people to favour cultural integration 
over multiculturalism for immigrants. In doing so, it provides Governments with a snap-
shot of contemporary views on this increasingly important issue and how these views 
may shift as demographic characteristics alter. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Tolerance of inter-personal behavioural differences is the leitmotif of Western 
society: many Western countries are major aid donors, most are high net recipients  
of immigrants, and all are signatories to a number of United Nations charters which  
repudiate discrimination and persecution and guarantee human rights. Yet, despite this 
reputation for liberalism, there can be little doubt that, in the past decade or so within 
Western countries, there is an increasing awareness of, and a hardening of attitudes  
towards people who are ‘different’ and, in particular, towards immigrants. The rise to 
electoral prominence in several of these countries of right-wing parties, with explicitly 
anti-foreigner agendas, is testimony to this. Arguments about the wearing of the Muslim 
veil in Britain, and the headscarf in France are part of a wider debate taking place across 
Europe – embracing inter alia the Netherlands, Belgium, Austria, Germany, Denmark, 
Italy, and Switzerland - about the erosion of national identity through the steady drip  
of special demands predicated on tolerance for cultural diversity1. 
A central pillar of the debate in Western countries about immigrants concerns 
the relative merits of multiculturalism versus assimilation: should immigrants preserve 
their traditions and culture while living in the host country or should they absorb them-
selves into the ways and manners of their hosts2? Of course, in practice, the distinction 
between the two need not be as stark. Within the two polar cases of multiculturalism and 
assimilation there are various degrees of integration and coexistence3. Integration pro-
vides for the coexistence of minority cultures with the majority culture. Assimilation 
requires the absorption of minority cultures into the majority culture. In simplistic terms 
the aim of assimilation is a monocultural, perhaps even a monofaith, society; the aim of 
integration is a multicultural, pluralist society4. Historically, there was a belief that that 
all immigrants would become assimilated in some way; either strict assimilation in 
which immigrants adopted the majority culture or in a US-style melting pot situation 
whereby minority and majority cultures merged to form a new entity, still predomi-
nantly majority culture but with a significant cultural input from the more recent  
arrivals. The proviso here was that all were expected to share a strong national identity 
as Americans5. This later situation may be described as partial assimilation with the  
preconditions being the new arrivals adopted the language, observed the law and  
contributed economically to the host country, while at the same time being free to  
observe customs and traditions, where these were deemed compatible with the established 
mainstream values of the host country. In practice, this is the type of system that 
                                                 
1 See, Jacques (2006) for a discussion of growing intolerance in Western countries towards some segments 
of their own society and the rest of the world and Prins and Salisbury (2008) who claim multiculturalism  
in Britain is weakening national resolve and harming national defense efforts. 
2 The British Secretary of State for Communities, Ruth Kelly, spoke in November 2006, about the need for 
‘honest debate about integration and cohesion in the UK’ and was closely followed by the British Prime 
Minister, Tony Blair, who declared that liberal values had to be defended from a ‘new and virulent ideology 
associated with a minority of our Muslim minority’. 
3 See, Entzinger, H. And Biezeveld, R. (2003) for a comparative discussion of integration by immigrants 
into some European Countries. 
4 See a discussion on this issue in The Guardian (2006). 
5 For a discussion of this view see Hall (1999). 
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emerged in a number of European countries. The basic problem with this system is that 
assimilation of any dimension is the result of the interaction of two factors that may not 
coincide or be mutually inclusive, structural assimilation and cultural assimilation.6 
Structural assimilation measures the extent of participation of groups and individuals in 
a larger society, basically at the institutional level. Cultural assimilation is concerned 
with the process of value orientation and identification of immigrants. Clearly, one can 
participate in a structural sense without altering core values and orientations. For exam-
ple, Moslems can, and do, actively participate in French society but do not necessarily 
accept the basic values of (Gallic) French life.  
As a result, to some the core problem with assimilation (both benign and severe) is the 
belief that involvement in institutional life will engender identification with majority 
views and values. This realization has led to some countries abandoning attempts at  
assimilation and moving toward the introduction of policies that allow separate  
development, within the overarching framework of a common institutional, legal and 
economic framework. 
The UK, at least at the level of Government policy, when down this path in the 1960’s 
with the then Home Secretary  Roy Jenkins, proclaiming that integration  is  ‘not a flat-
tening process of assimilation but equal opportunity accompanied by cultural diversity 
in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance’7. 
However, neither the quasi-assimilation countries nor the quasi- multi-cultural countries, 
or those in between, factored in the impact on their policies of the mass migration from 
persons of different language, ethnicity and religion that has occurred in Europe over the 
past two decades. Specifically, those countries that favoured assimilation faced the 
daunting problem of inducing large number of persons, in years to come possibly a nu-
merical majority, to adopt the current mainstream values and cultures, particularly 
where these values were diametrically opposed to their own set of social and religious 
beliefs. Similarly, the multi-culturalists were faced with a problem that a policy which 
legally enshrines respect for individual also may provide a mechanism for pursuing 
separate development and the balkanization of the population. The impetus given to 
these types of consideration post 9/11 has led to a re-awakening of a debate on immigra-
tion that many had thought had been completed decades earlier. 
In 2003 the EU commission was so concerned about the lack of common approaches  
to the immigration issue in Europe that they commissioned a study into the degree of 
integration currently practiced in the EU by the member states8. 
Similarly, scholars in many European countries investigated the numerous currents of 
debate into an appropriate immigration policy for Europe. 
This paper does not directly answer this question but it addresses a related query:  
who are the people in Western countries who think that immigrants should integrate  
culturally, and how do they differ from those who think that immigrants should preserve 
a separate cultural existence? Although there is a vast literature on immigrants living in 
                                                 
6 This distinction was first made by Gordon (1964) and Hoffman-Nowotny (1970). 
7 See, The Guardian (2006). 
8 See, Entzinger and Biezeveld (2003). 
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the West, and on immigration to Western countries, this question, to the best of our 
knowledge, has not been addressed in any systematic manner9. This study exploits a 
unique set of data provided by The Human Beliefs and Values Survey (HBVS) for the 
period 1999-2002, described in Ingelhart et. al., 2004. The HBVS asked over 30,000 
respondents in 18 Western countries whether they thought it better that immigrants 
should ‘maintain their distinct customs and traditions’ or that they ‘take over the  
customs of the country’. In addition, the HBVS contained a wealth of information on the 
attributes and circumstances of the respondents – inter alia their political orientation, 
attitude to immigrants, sex, age, income, social class, labour market and marital status, 
education level. We used these data, in conjunction with the data on responses, to  
identify - and to estimate the strength of - those factors which led people to favour  
integration, over multiculturalism as a basis for immigration policy. 
 
2. Multiculturalism and Differing National Responses 
 
Rex and Singh (2003) outline two polar opposite views of multiculturalism. The ‘soft 
view’ is illustrated in the approving phrase often used by politicians. ‘We now live in a 
multicultural society’. By this statement multiculturalism is seen as a natural extension 
of liberal democracy and the democratic values of tolerance and respect for diversity. 
Conversely, the ‘hard view’ sees multiculturalism, with its emphasis on the group over 
the individual, as a threat to liberal democratic values (Barry, 1999) and by extension 
the view that ‘economic migrants or political migrants and refugees may be seen as  
endangering the unity of society’ (Rex and Singh, 2003 p.4). A ‘middle view’ sees  
multiculturalism, or at least the acknowledgement and toleration of a variety of cultural 
expressions as one, possibly the only, feasible means for the Western nations to cope 
with the issues raised by globalization, mass immigration and the growth of large and 
increasing vocal ethnic minorities within their borders. All of these views may be seen, 
to varying degrees within different European countries. Britain is often seen as having 
the most developed form of multiculturalism in that, under official policy at least, the 
British advocate a society that extends equitable status to distinct cultural and religious 
groups with no one’s culture predominating. UK law allows for the extension of legal 
recognition to specific minority groups such as Black, White and Muslim and even  
special legal protections for the members of these groups10. Conversely, France is often 
perceived as main proponent of assimilation of the European nations11. The French  
system in its harshest form presumes a loss of many characteristics of the absorbed 
group. Legally, all citizens are simply recognized as citizens, as opposed to ‘French  
Arabs’ for example. In between these two extremes come the policies of Germany, 
Sweden and the Netherlands. Under the German system (Gastarbeider) immigrants,  
independent of their length of stay, are treated as guest workers and denied citizenship. 
The Dutch response to cultural diversity has been referred to as pillarisation under 
                                                 
9 See inter alia: Card (2005) on the successful assimilation of post-1965 immigrants to the USA; Borooah 
and Mangan (2007) on the assimilation of immigrants in Australia; Polachek et. al. (2006) on the economics 
of immigration and social diversity and Hanson (2005) on the divisive effects of immigration in the USA.   
10 See report of the Commission on the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain (2000). 
11 Withol de Wenden (2003) speaks of the Jacobin Tradition in France, dating back to the French revolution, 
which  has opposed the right to be different,  pluralism and group rights.  
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which separate education, separate trade unions, and separate media has grown up, 
firstly for Catholics and Protestants but later extended to immigrants. Rath (1991) 
claims that this has led to ‘minorisation’ and singling out migrants for unequal  
treatment. In Sweden, the provision for ethnic minorities was conceived of as part of  
the provisions of the Welfare State (Rex and Singh, 2003). 
There are however signs that ‘official policies’ are changing and converging on models 
which are both politically expedient and able to cope with the reality that most countries 
are multi-ethnic. These changes are either in response to international events or shifts  
in public sentiment. In Britain, the stridently multicultural Commission on the Future of 
Multi-Ethnic Britain (2000), was very quickly tempered by the calls for ‘Building  
Cohesive Communities’ (2001) and a quest for ‘Britishness’ (Singh, 2003). 
Wihtol de Wenden (2003) argues that ‘In France, like most democracies, the rise of 
claims for difference means that the republican model of integration has no other choice 
but to integrate with multiculturalism’ (p.77). Even in those nations that helped define 
Multiculturalism, Canada and Australia, there is a recognition that multiculturalism  
has been imposed from the top and that official policy has often run ahead of popular 
opinion. For example, Castles (1997) argues, from an Australian point of view, that  
multiculturalism has developed in a top down and ad hoc way as a strategy for  
integrating immigrant communities into a basically unchanged society. 
Politicians and policy makers therefore face a dilemma. In Europe in particular, the  
existence of very well established ethnic minorities, some of which are tipped to become 
majorities in the not too distant future, and  an increasing reliance on immigration as a 
source of labour within an aging domestic population make the imposition of a purely  
assimilation solution highly impractical. On the other hand there are clear signs that full 
multiculturalism, needs to be reigned back or face a widespread political and social 
backlash. 
As well, there are differences between the official national policy on immigration and 
the views of the effected populations. Not all French favour assimilation and not all 
British are multicultural, but can we establish whether the French people in their views 
are essentially assimilationist and the British essentially multicultural, and if so are  
inter-country differences in views caused primarily by attribute effects (for example, 
does Italy have more persons with right wing views than Spain?) or coefficient effects 
(are Spanish right-wingers more strident in their integrationist views than Italian right-
wingers?). 
Ideally Governments should attempt to design public policies that not only serve  
national interests but are also compatible with the views of the domestic populations. 
The analysis of data from the Human Values and Beliefs Survey is one way of assessing 
if this type of compatibility is currently taking place in Europe. An analysis of the  
survey makes for interesting comparisons with ‘official attitudes’ as expressed in the EU 
(2003) report on ‘Benchmarking Integration in Europe’. 
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3. Data and Estimation 
 
Table 1 shows the proportions of respondents in 18 Western countries, who  
favoured either assimilation or multiculturalism. Respondents from Austria (82 percent), 
Belgium (72 percent), Denmark (77 percent), Germany (78 percent), Iceland (73  
percent), and the Netherlands (70 percent) were most in favour of immigrants being  
absorbed into the host culture. On the other hand, the majority of respondents in the 
Mediterranean countries – Greece (77 percent), Italy (60 percent), Malta (55 percent) 
and Spain (52%) favoured multiculturalism. In order to estimate the effects of the differ-
ent respondent attributes, on the likelihood of respondents regarding it as preferable that 
immigrants integrate, we estimated a logit equation whose dependent variable took the 
value 1 if a respondent thought it better that an immigrant should adopt the customs of 
the host country and the value 0 if he/she thought it preferable that immigrants should 
maintain their own distinct culture and traditions. The estimation results from this model 
are shown in Table 2 with a positive (negative) coefficient implying that the probability 
of the outcome (‘regarding integration as preferable’) would increase (decrease) with an 
increase in the value of the associated variable. Shown alongside each coefficient is the 
implied change in the probability of the outcome, consequent upon a change in value of 
the variable, the values of the other variables held constant at their mean values. These 
are the marginal probabilities associated with the different variables; for discrete  
variables – as are all the explanatory variables used - the marginal probabilities refer  
to changes consequent upon a move from the residual category for that variable to the 
category in question. 
From the results of Table 2 it is possible to paint a portrait of those who thought 
that integration was preferable to multiculturalism. Respondents who expressed ambiva-
lence to assisting immigrants, for example those who said they might or might not help 
immigrants, were much more likely to demand integration - by respectively, 16 and 25 
percentage points - than those who expressed a clear willingness to help immigrants. 
Similarly, those who were opposed to having an immigrant for a neighbour, or those 
who regarded maintaining order in society as the most important social goal, were more 
likely to support integration than, respectively, those who were prepared to have immi-
grant neighbors or those who thought that, compared to preserving order, other social 
aims were more important (by 10 and 7 percentage points respectively). In terms of  
social class, classes C1 and C2 were more likely to support integration – by respectively 
– 3 and 4 percentage points – than either the highest (A-B) or lowest social classes  
(D-E). 
Conversely, people who regarded themselves as politically left-wing or as  
middle-of-the-road were less likely - by respectively, 10 and 2 percentage points -  
to support integration than those who thought of themselves as right-wing; young  
persons (15-29 years) and middle-aged persons (30-49 years) were less likely - by  
respectively, 9 and 6 percentage points - to support integration than those who were  
50 years or older; people with children were more likely to support integration, by  
5 percentage points, compared to childless persons; those with a high level of education 
were less likely to support integration, compared to the moderately well educated or the 
poorly educated, by 7 percentage points. In terms of labour market status, compared  
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to retired and employed persons, the unemployed (by 7 percentage points), students  
(by 7 percentage points), and housewives (by 3 percentage points) were less likely to 
support integration. 
Using the above results one can build profiles of those who are most likely to, 
respectively, support cultural integration and multiculturalism. The probability of  
persons supporting cultural assimilation was 85 percent if they: (i) did not believe in 
helping immigrants; (ii) would not want an immigrant for a neighbour; (iii) believed in 
the primacy of order in society as a social goal; (v) regarded themselves as politically 
right-wing (vi) were aged 50 yrs or more and retired. At the other extreme, the probabi-
lity of persons supporting cultural assimilation was only 25 percent if they: (i) did  
believe in helping immigrants; (ii) would not object to an immigrant for a neighbour; 
(iii) did not believe in the primacy of order in society as a social goal; (v) regarded 
themselves as politically left-wing; and (vi) were students aged 15-29 years. Finally, 
acceptance of multiculturalism rose with higher levels of formal education. Based on 
these results it is possible to see a process where differences in the composition of  
the respective populations may provide an explanation for apparent national differences 
in attitudes to multiculturalism. But do differences based purely on nationality also 
emerge? 
 
4. Country Effects versus Personal Characteristics 
 
Table 2 shows that, even after controlling for personal characteristics, there 
were significant country effects: ceteris paribus respondents in some countries (Austria, 
France and Germany) were more likely to regard assimilation as preferable to multicul-
turalism than respondents in other countries (Italy, Portugal, Spain). However, Table 2 
traces country effects purely through intercept shifts and holds the slope coefficients 
(which reflect attitude intensity) as being invariant across countries. If the equation  
had been estimated separately for the different countries then we would be able to  
decompose the overall level of difference into two distinct components; First, countries 
might differ in terms of their attributes: for example, one country might have more right-
wing respondents than another. Second, countries might differ in terms of their  
coefficients: right-wing respondents in one country might be more pro-assimilation 
compared to right-wing respondents in another country. 
In order to disentangle the relative strengths of ‘attribute differences’ and  
‘coefficient differences’ in explaining the overall difference, we divided the countries 
into two groups: ‘Northern Europe’, with a large proportion of respondents favouring 
cultural assimilation (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Sweden) and ‘Southern Europe’, with a smaller propor-
tion, sometimes a minority, of respondents favouring assimilation (Italy, Greece, Malta, 
Portugal, Spain, Great Britain, Ireland, and Northern Ireland). The ‘assimilation  
equation’, shown in Table 2, was then estimated separately for the ‘North’ and  
the ‘South’ groups of countries and these estimates are shown in Table 3; lastly, these 
estimates were used to decompose the difference between the North and the South,  
in the average proportion of their respondents who favoured assimilation, into a part 
caused by attribute differences and a residual part engendered by coefficient differences. 
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The column headed ‘sample average’ in Table 4 shows that 70.8 percent of  
respondents from the North and 43.1 percent of respondents from the South regarded 
cultural assimilation as preferable to multiculturalism: a difference of 27.7 percentage 
points. So, compared to respondents from the South, Northern respondents had an  
‘assimilation surplus’. 
Partly, this may have had to do with the fact that the coefficient responses, to  
a given vector of values of the ‘assimilation determining’ variables, were different  
between the countries of the ‘North’ and the ‘South’: Table 3 shows that the ordered 
logit estimates were, for several variables, significantly different between the two 
groups of countries. Partly, however, this may be due to the fact that the attribute vectors 
were different between the Northern and Southern countries. This section assesses the 
proportions of the overall difference in satisfaction levels between Western and  
non-Western countries which were caused by, respectively, ‘coefficient’ and ‘attribute’ 
differences12. 
To facilitate this analysis it is useful to assign northern coefficients to the  
attributes of southern respondents and compare with the original southern results and, 
reverse the exercise by assigning southern coefficients to northern respondents. 
The next column of Table 4 shows that if the attributes of Southern respondents 
had been evaluated at ‘Northern’ coefficients, 68.2 percent of respondents from  
countries of the South would prefer cultural assimilation over multiculturalism: only  
2.6 percentage points below the average proportion of 70.8 percent for the Northern  
respondents. Consequently, of the overall difference of 27.7 percentage points between 
Northern and Southern countries, in their respective proportions preferring cultural  
assimilation to multiculturalism, 2.6 percentage points, or 9 percent, could be explained 
by attribute differences between the two groups, the remainder (91 percent) being due to 
coefficient differences. 
On an alternative decomposition, if the attributes of Northern respondents had 
been evaluated at ‘Southern’ coefficients, 46.3 percent of respondents from countries of 
the North would prefer cultural assimilation over multiculturalism: only 3.2 percentage 
points above the average proportion of 43.1 percent for the South. Consequently,  
on this alternative decomposition, of the overall difference of 27.7 percentage points 
between Northern and Southern countries, in their respective proportions preferring  
cultural assimilation to multiculturalism, only 3.2 percentage points, or 11 percent, 
could be explained by attribute differences between the two groups, the remainder  
(89 percent) being due to coefficient differences. On average, therefore, only 10 percent 
of the overall difference of 27.7 percentage points between Northern and Southern  
countries, in their respective proportions preferring cultural assimilation to multicultur-
alism was due to differences between them in their attributes, 90 percent being  
explained by differences between them in their responses to a given set of attributes. 
Overall, the large bulk of differences in views were not caused by compositional  
differences amongst the populations, but by different levels intensity in the views held 
on immigration across groups in the broad Northern Europe/Southern Europe breakup. 
                                                 
12 The methodology used is that of Oaxaca (1973) adapted to probabilistic models (Nielsen, 1998; Borooah 
and Iyer, 2005).  
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5. Conclusions         
 
This paper set out to examine views on immigration policy in Europe, princi-
pally the extremes of multiculturalism versus assimilation. It asked the question: are the 
observed national differences in attitudes towards multiculturalism and assimilation due 
primarily to differences in attributes of the respective populations or differences in  
the coefficients of the various groups within each country? For example, do views  
in Germany differ from the UK because there are a higher proportion of right-wingers in 
Germany or because German right wingers think differently (more stridently) about 
immigration than British right wingers? 
To answer this question, this paper undertook an inquiry into the nature of people in 
Western countries who thought that immigrants should assimilate into the culture of the 
host country and, by implication, into the nature of those who thought it best if immi-
grants preserved their own cultures and traditions. Having identified the personal char-
acteristics that might make it likely that people would support one or the other camp, the 
paper also pointed to the existence of strong country effects: which side one supported 
in the assimilation versus multiculturalism debate depended not just on who you were 
but also on where you lived. Using a decomposition analysis, the paper showed that 
these inter-country differences (or, more accurately, differences between a group of 
countries who were strong supporters of multiculturalism and another group of countries 
who were less enthusiastic about multiculturalism) were largely due to differences  
between countries in how they responded to a given set attributes rather than to differ-
ences between them in their attributes. In other words, the main differences were not 
between middle class and working class or males and females but between nationalities, 
particularly when these nationalities were grouped together into Northern and Southern 
Europe. These results, while interesting in themselves also have significant policy  
implications. If attitudes to immigration policy were generically determined by attribute 
effects we would be able to detect and accurately forecast trends in Europe towards or 
against multiculturalism by using trends in predictor variables such as aging, acceptance 
of right wing views and the relative deepening of education. However, the results of this 
paper show that predictions in this area are not so simple. Differences in attitudes to 
immigration between the broad groups of North Europe and South Europe have been 
shown to be overwhelmingly determined by inter-country differences in attitudes across 
compositional groups. This conclusion does not sit well with the recommendations  
of the EU Commission into immigration (2003) who argued ‘there is a growing recogni-
tion of the need to act collectively at the EU level by adopting additional common  
elements and adapting old ones to new challenges’. The inevitable conclusion from our 
results is that the development of a unified-European policy on this important immigra-
tion question may not be easy to define or direct. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Borooah . Vani, Mangan John 
 
42 
References 
 
Barry, B., (1999), Culture and Equity: An Egalitarian Critique of Multiculturalism,  
Cambridge, Polity Press 
Borooah, V.K., Iyer, S., (2005), ‘The Decomposition of Inter-Group Differences in a 
Logit Model: Extending the Blinder-Oaxaca Approach with an Application to 
School Enrolment in India’, Journal of Economic and Social Measurement, 30,  
279-293. 
Borooah, V.K., Mangan, J., (2007), ‘Living Here, Born There: The Economic Life of 
Australia's Immigrants’, European Journal of Political Economy, 23 (2), 486-511. 
Building Cohesive Communities (2001), A Report of the Ministerial Group on Public 
Order and Community Cohesion, UK, London, Government Home Office. 
Card, D., (2005), ‘Is the New immigration Really so Bad?’  The Economic Journal, 115, 
F300-F323. 
Castles, S., (1997), ‘Multicultural Citizenship: A Response to the Dilemma of Globali-
sation and National Identity’, Journal of Intercultural Studies, 18(1), 5-22. 
Entzinger, H., Biezeveld, R., (2003), ‘Benchmarking Immigrant Integration’, Report  
prepared for the EU Commission, Brussels. 
Hall, P., (1999), ‘(Structural) Integration Vs (Cultural) Assimilation’, paper presented  
to the 16th Pan-Africanism Conference, Indiana University. 
Hanson, G.H., (2005), Why Does Immigration Divide America? Public Finance and 
Public Opposition to Open Borders, Washington DC: Institute for International 
Economics. 
Ingelhart, R., Basáñez, M., Díez-Medrano J., Halmn, L., Luijkx, R., (2004), Human  
Beliefs and Values: a cross-cultural sourcebook based on the 990-2002 values  
surveys, Siglo XXI Editores: Buenos Aires. 
Jacques, M., (2000), ‘Globalisation making the West more Intolerant’, The Guardian,  
17th April, p. 11-12. 
Nielsen, H.S., (1998), ‘Discrimination and Detailed Decomposition in a Logit Model’, 
Economics Letters, 61, 115-120. 
Oaxaca, R., (1973), ‘Male-Female Wage Differentials in Urban Labor Markets’,  
International Economic Review, 14, 693-709. 
Polachek, S.W., Chiswick, C., Rapoport, H., (2006), The Economics of Immigration and 
Social Diversity, Research in Labor Economics series, vol. 24, Amsterdam and San 
Diego: Elsevier. 
Prins, G., Salibury, R., (2008), Risk, Threat and Security; The Case of the United  
Kingdom, Royal United Services Institute, London. 
Rath, J., (1991), ‘Minosering: De Social Constructe van Ethnische Minderheden’, PhD 
thesis, University of Utrect. 
Multiculturalism versus Assimilation: Attitudes towards Immigrants  
in Western Countries 
 
43 
Rex, J., Singh, G., (2003), ‘Multiculturalism and political Integration in Modern  
Nation States’ International Journal of Multicultural Societies, 5(1), 3-19. 
Richard, J., (1997) ‘A French Point of View: Statisitics, Integration and Universalism’, 
In Colloque, J, On the Way to a Multicultural Society, Neuchatel, 6th-7th June. 
Singh, G., (2003), ‘Multiculturalism in Contemporary Britain; Reflections on the  
Leicester Model’, International Journal of Multicultural Societies, 5(1), 40-54. 
The Guardian (2006), ‘Integration vs. Forced Assimilation’, May 12th, p. 15. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Borooah . Vani, Mangan John 
 
44 
Appendix 
 
Table 1: Integration versus Multiculturalism in Western Countries, 1999-2000 
 
Country: sample size Integration Multiculturalism 
Austria: 1,404 82 18 
Belgium: 1,708 72 28 
Denmark: 837 77 23 
Finland: 924 67 33 
France: 1,439 74 26 
Germany:1,869 78 22 
Greece: 1,031 23 77 
Iceland: 896 73 27 
Ireland: 873 43 57 
Italy: 1,763 40 60 
Luxembourg: 1,013 40 60 
Malta: 929 45 55 
Netherlands: 913 70 30 
Portugal: 841 53 47 
Spain: 950 48 52 
Sweden: 805 64 36 
Great Britain: 836 55 45 
Northern Ireland: 827 47 53 
All Western Countries: 
19,858 
60 40 
Source: The Human Beliefs and Values Survey: Ingelhart et. al., 2004. 
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Table 2: Logit Esitmates of the Integration Model* 
 
Determining Variables Coefficient  
estimates 
Marginal  
Probabilities 
Would perhaps help immigrants 0.676*** .157*** 
 (15.37)  
Would not help immigrants 1.187*** .252*** 
 (22.20)  
Sympathises, to some extent, with immigrants 0.349*** .079*** 
 (5.22)  
Does not sympathise with immigrants  0.293*** .067*** 
 (2.96)  
Religion: very important, rather important -0.174*** -.041*** 
 (4.70)  
Would not want immigrant as neighbour 0.453*** .102*** 
 (8.02)  
Female 0.001 .000 
 (0.02)  
Associates with other people regularly 0.044 .010 
 (0.91)  
Believes that maintaining order in the nation is the 
most important government objective 
0.307*** .072*** 
 (8.75)  
Left-wing politically -0.425*** -.103*** 
 (9.61)  
Middle-of-the-road politically -0.084** -.020** 
 (2.20)  
Young (15-29) -0.365*** -.088*** 
 (5.99)  
Middle-aged (30-49) -0.247*** -.059*** 
 (5.45)  
High education -0.304*** -.073*** 
 (5.94)  
Middle education 0.005 .001 
 (0.12)  
Social class: A-B (upper class, upper middle class) 0.107 .025 
 (1.51)  
Social class: C1 (middle, non-manual) 0.118** .028** 
 (1.97)  
Social class: C2 (middle, manual)  0.173*** .040*** 
 (2.94)  
Has children 0.207*** .049*** 
 (4.69)  
Employed -0.064 -.015 
 (1.22)  
Unemployed -0.300*** -.073*** 
 (3.60)  
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Student -0.304*** -.074*** 
 (3.45)  
Housewife -0.140** -.033** 
 (2.14)  
Austria 1.615*** .291*** 
 (14.08)  
Belgium 1.185*** .235*** 
 (11.79)  
Denmark 1.407*** .259*** 
 (11.90)  
Finland 0.953*** .194*** 
 (8.90)  
France 1.197*** .235*** 
 (11.26)  
Germany 1.358*** .260*** 
 (12.50)  
Greece -0.734*** -.181*** 
 (6.64)  
Iceland 1.359*** .254*** 
 (12.39)  
Ireland 0.137 .032 
 (1.30)  
Italy -0.099 -.024 
 (0.98)  
Luxembourg -0.204* -.049* 
 (1.81)  
Malta -0.003 -.001 
 (0.03)  
The Netherlands 1.345*** .252*** 
 (12.45)  
Portugal 0.428*** .096*** 
 (4.09)  
Spain 0.189* .044* 
 (1.72)  
Sweden 1.203*** .232*** 
 (10.36)  
Great Britain 0.252** .058** 
 (2.20)  
Constant -0.695***  
 (6.56)  
Observations 19071  
Notes to Table 2: 
* Dependent variable = 1, if respondent thinks integration is preferable to multiculturalism = 0,  
if respondent thinks multiculturalism is preferable to integration 
1. Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses.  
2. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
3. Residual categories are: (i) Would help immigrants (ii) Sympathises with immigrants; (iii) religion not 
very important or not at all important (iv) Male; (v) Old (50+ years); (vi) Right wing politically; (vii) Low 
level of education; (viii) Retired; (ix) social class D-E (manual, unskilled); (x) Northern Ireland.  
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Table 3: Logit Esitmates of the Integration Model*: Northern and Southern Countries** 
 
Determining Variables Coefficient estimates: 
Northern Countries 
Coefficient estimates: 
Southern Countries 
Would perhaps help  
immigrants 
0.811*** 0.496*** 
 (14.61) (7.70) 
Would not help immigrants 1.321*** 0.955*** 
 (19.16) (12.37) 
Sympathises, to some extent, 
with immigrants 
0.447*** -0.018 
 (5.50) (0.17) 
Does not sympathise with 
immigrants  
0.475*** -0.011 
 (3.56) (0.07) 
Religion: very important, 
rather important 
-0.195*** -0.192*** 
 (4.20) (3.55) 
Would not want immigrant as 
neighbour 
0.466*** 0.330*** 
 (5.28) (4.62) 
Female 0.077* -0.080 
 (1.66) (1.49) 
Associates with other people 
regularly 
-0.558*** 0.067 
 (10.49) (1.00) 
Believes that maintaining  
order in the nation is the most 
important government  
objective 
0.377*** 0.135*** 
 (8.29) (2.62) 
Left-wing politically -0.413*** -0.356*** 
 (7.19) (5.30) 
Middle-of-the-road politically -0.062 -0.070 
 (1.19) (1.30) 
Young (15-29) -0.296*** -0.471*** 
 (3.67) (5.20) 
Middle-aged (30-49) -0.246*** -0.263*** 
 (4.07) (3.96) 
High education -0.230*** -0.590*** 
 (3.68) (7.48) 
Middle education 0.025 -0.107* 
 (0.46) (1.81) 
Social class: A-B (upper class, 
upper middle class) 
0.203*** 0.193** 
 (2.81) (2.03) 
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Social class: C1 (middle,  
non-manual) 
0.267*** 0.175*** 
 (4.56) (2.62) 
Social class: C2 (middle, 
manual)  
0.202*** 0.156** 
 (3.34) (2.30) 
Has children 0.292*** 0.143** 
 (4.99) (2.20) 
Employed -0.150** -0.069 
 (2.22) (0.89) 
Unemployed -0.252** -0.277** 
 (2.26) (2.25) 
Student -0.363*** -0.388*** 
 (3.23) (2.79) 
Housewife -0.266*** -0.120 
 (2.78) (1.36) 
Constant 0.315*** -0.248** 
 (3.09) (2.16) 
Observations 11301 7770 
Notes to Table 3: 
* Dependent variable = 1, if respondent thinks integration is preferable to multiculturalism = 0, if respon-
dent thinks multiculturalism is preferable to integration. 
** Northern countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Sweden. 
   Southern Countries: Italy, Greece, Malta, Portugal, Spain, Great Britain, Ireland, and Northern Ireland. 
1. Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses.  
2. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
3. Residual categories are: (i) Would help immigrants (ii) Sympathises with immigrants; (iii) religion not 
very important or not at all important (iv) Male; (v) Old (50+ years); (vi) Right wing politically; (vii) Low 
level of education; (viii) Retired; (ix) social class D-E (manual, unskilled). 
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Table 4: The Decomposition of Differences Between North and South European 
Countries in the Proportions of Their Respondents Wanting Cultural Integration 
 
Sample 
Average 
Non-Western attributes evaluated using  
Western coefficient estimates 
N SP P  ˆ( )
ˆ( )
P
P
N N
S N
X ,
X ,
 
ˆ( )
ˆ( )
P
P
S N
S S
X ,
X ,
 
0.708 - 0.431 = 0.277 0.708 - 0.682 = 0.026 0.682- 0.431 = 0.251 
   
Sample 
Average 
Western attributes evaluated using  
non-Western coefficient estimates 
+++++ N SP P  ˆ(
ˆ( )
P
P
N S
S S
X , )
X ,
 
ˆ( )
ˆ( )
N N
N SW
P
P
X ,
X ,
 
0.708 - 0.431 = -0.277 0.463-0.431=0.032 0.708-0.463=0.245 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
